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Abstract
Open distributed systems are typically composed by an unknown number of processes
running in heterogeneous hosts. Their communication often requires tolerance to temporary
disconnections and security against malicious actions. Tuple spaces are a well-known coor-
dination model for this kind of systems. They can support communication that is decoupled
both in time and space. There are currently several implementations of distributed fault-
tolerant tuple spaces but they are not Byzantine-resilient, i.e., they do not provide a correct
service if some replicas are attacked and start to misbehave. This paper presents an efficient
implementation of LBTS, a Linearizable Byzantine fault-tolerant Tuple Space. LBTS uses a
novel Byzantine quorum systems replication technique in which most operations are imple-
mented by quorum protocols while stronger operations are implemented by more expensive
protocols based on consensus. LBTS is linearizable and wait-free, showing interesting per-
formance gains when compared to a similar construction based on state machine replication.
Keywords: Tuple Spaces, Byzantine Fault Tolerance, Intrusion Tolerance, Quorum Systems.
1 Introduction
Coordination is a classical distributed systems paradigm based on the idea that separating the sys-
tem activities in computation and coordination can simplify the design of distributed applications
[22]. The generative coordination model, originally introduced in the LINDA programming lan-
guage [21], uses a shared memory object called a tuple space to support the coordination. Tuple
spaces can support communication that is decoupled both in time – processes do not have to be
active at the same time – and space – processes do not need to know each others’ addresses [9].
The tuple space can be considered to be a kind of storage that stores tuples, i.e., finite sequences
of values. The operations supported are essentially three: inserting a tuple in the space, reading
a tuple from the space and removing a tuple from the space. The programming model supported
∗This report was submitted for publication.
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by tuple spaces is regarded as simple, expressive and elegant, being implemented in middleware
platforms like GIGASPACES [24], Sun’s JAVASPACES [40] and IBM’s TSPACES [41].
There has been some research about fault-tolerant tuple spaces (e.g., [3, 43]). The objective
of those works is essentially to guarantee the availability of the service provided by the tuple
space, even if some of the servers that implement it crash. This paper goes one step further by
describing a tuple space that tolerates Byzantine faults. More specifically, this work is part of a
recent research effort in intrusion-tolerant systems, i.e., on systems that tolerate malicious faults,
like attacks and intrusions [20, 42]. These faults can be modeled as arbitrary faults, also called
Byzantine faults [27] in the literature.
The proposed tuple space is dubbed LBTS since it is a Linearizable Byzantine Tuple Space.
LBTS is implemented by a set of distributed servers and behaves according to its specification
if up to a number of these servers fail, either accidentally (e.g., crashing) or maliciously (e.g.,
by being attacked and starting to misbehave). Moreover, LBTS also tolerates accidental and
malicious faults in an unbounded number of clients accessing it.
Although this is the first linearizable Byzantine tuple space that we are aware of, there are
several domains in which it might be interesting to use this service. One case are application
domains with frequent disconnections and mobility that can benefit from the time and space
decoupling provided by LBTS. Two examples of such domains are ad hoc networks [35] and
mobile agents [9]. Another domain are bag-of-tasks applications in grid computing [18], where
a large number of computers are used to run complex computations. These applications are
decoupled in space and time since the computers that run the application can enter and leave the
grid dynamically.
LBTS has two important properties. First, it is linearizable, i.e., it provides a strong concur-
rency semantics in which operations invoked concurrently appear to take effect instantaneously
sometime between their invocation and the return of their result [26]. Second, it is wait-free,
i.e., every correct client process that invokes an operation in LBTS eventually receives a response,
independently of the failure of other client processes or access contention [25].
Additionally, LBTS is based on a novel Byzantine quorum systems replication philosophy in
which the semantics of each operation is carefully analyzed and a protocol as simple as possible
is defined for each. Most operations on the tuple space are implemented by pure asynchronous
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Byzantine quorum protocols [29]. However, a tuple space is a shared memory object with con-
sensus number higher than one [39], according to Herlihy’s wait-free hierarchy [25], so it cannot
be implemented using only asynchronous quorum protocols [17]. In this paper we identify the
tuple space operations that require stronger protocols, and show how to implement them using a
Byzantine PAXOS consensus protocol [11, 32, 44]. The philosophy behind our design is that sim-
ple operations are implemented by “cheap” quorum-based protocols, while stronger operations
are implemented by more expensive protocols based on consensus. These protocols are more ex-
pensive in two senses. First, they have higher communication and message complexities (e.g., the
communication complexity is typically O(n2) instead of O(n)). Second, while Byzantine quorum
protocols can be strictly asynchronous, consensus has been shown to be impossible to solve de-
terministically in asynchronous systems [19], so additional assumptions are needed: either about
synchrony or about the existence of random oracles. Although there are other recent works that
use quorum-based protocols to implement objects stronger than atomic registers [1] and to op-
timize state machine replication [14], LBTS is the first to mix these two approaches supporting
wait freedom and being efficient even in the presence of contention.
Summary of Contributions. The main contributions of the paper are the following:
1. it presents the first linearizable tuple space that tolerates Byzantine faults; the tuple space
requires n≥ 4 f +1 servers, from which f can be faulty, and tolerates any number of faulty
clients. Moreover, it presents a variant of this design that requires the minimal number of
servers (n≥ 3 f +1) at the cost of having weaker semantics;
2. it introduces a new design philosophy to implement shared memory objects with consensus
number higher than one [25], by using quorum protocols for the weaker operations and
consensus protocols for stronger operations. To implement this philosophy several new
techniques are developed;
3. it presents the correctness conditions for a linearizable tuple space; although this type of
object has been used for more than two decades, there is no other work that provides such
a formalization;
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4. it compares the proposed approach with Byzantine state machine replication [11, 38] and
shows that LBTS presents several benefits: some operations are much cheaper and it sup-
ports the concurrent execution of operations, instead of executing them in total order.
Paper Organization. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background
information for the paper as well as the definition of the system model assumed by our protocols.
The definition of the correctness conditions for a linearizable tuple space is formalized in Sec-
tion 3. The LBTS protocols are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents several optimizations
and improvements for the basic LBTS protocols. An alternative version of LBTS is presented in
Section 6. Sections 7 and 8 presents an evaluation of LBTS and summarize the related work, re-
spectively. The conclusions are presented in Section 9, and an Appendix containing the complete
proofs of the protocols is included in the end.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Tuple Spaces
The generative coordination model, originally introduced in the LINDA programming language
[21], uses a shared memory object called a tuple space to support the coordination between pro-
cesses. This object essentially allows the storage and retrieval of generic data structures called
tuples.
Each tuple is a sequence of fields. A tuple t in which all fields have a defined value is called
an entry. A tuple with one or more undefined fields is called a template (usually denoted by a bar,
e.g., t). An entry t and a template t match— m(t, t)— if they have the same number of fields and
all defined field values of t are equal to the corresponding field values of t. Templates are used to
allow content-addressable access to tuples in the tuple space (e.g., template 〈1,2,∗〉 matches any
tuple with three fields in which 1 and 2 are the values of the first and second fields, respectively).
A tuple space provides three basic operations [21]: out(t) that outputs/inserts the entry t in the
tuple space; inp(t) that reads and removes some tuple that matches t from the tuple space; rdp(t)
that reads a tuple that matches t without removing it from the space. The inp and rdp operations
are non-blocking, i.e., if there is no tuple in the space that matches the template, an error code is
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returned. Most tuple spaces also provide blocking versions of these operations, in and rd. These
operations work in the same way of their non-blocking versions but stay blocked until there is
some matching tuple available.
These few operations together with the content-addressable capabilities of generative coordi-
nation provide a simple and powerfull programming model for distributed applications [5, 21, 41].
The drawback of this model is that it depends on an infrastructure object (the tuple space), which
is usually implemented as a centralized server, being a single point of failure, the main problem
addressed in this paper.
2.2 System Model
The system is composed by an infinite set of client processes1 Π= {p1, p2, p3, ...} which interact
with a set of n serversU = {s1,s2, ...,sn} that implements a tuple space with certain dependability
properties. We consider that each client process and each server has an unique id.
All communication between client processes and servers is made over reliable authenticated
point-to-point channels2. All servers are equipped with a local clock used to compute message
timeouts. These clocks are not synchronized so their values can drift.
In terms of failures, we assume that an arbitrary number of client processes and a bound of
up to f ≤ bn−14 c servers can be subject to Byzantine failures, i.e., they can deviate arbitrarily
from the algorithm they are specified to execute and work in collusion to corrupt the system
behavior. Clients or servers that do not follow their algorithm in some way are said to be faulty.
A client/server that is not faulty is said to be correct. We assume fault independence for the
servers, i.e., that the probability of each server failing is independent of another server being
faulty. This assumption can be substantiated in practice using several kinds of diversity [12, 36].
We assume an eventually synchronous system model [16]: in all executions of the system,
there is a bound ∆ and an instant GST (Global Stabilization Time), so that every message sent by a
correct server to another correct server at instant u>GST is received before u+∆. ∆ and GST are
unknown. The intuition behind this model is that the system can work asynchronously (with no
bounds on delays) most of the time but there are stable periods in which the communication delay
1We also call a client process simply client or process.
2These channels can easily be implemented in practice assuming fair links and using retransmissions, or in a more
practical view, using TCP over IPsec or SSL/TLS.
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is bounded (assuming local computations take negligible time)3. This assumption of eventually
synchrony is needed to guarantee the termination of the Byzantine PAXOS [11, 32, 44]. An
execution of a distributed algorithm is said to be nice if the bound ∆ always holds and there are
no server failures.
Additionally, we use a digital signature scheme that includes a signing function and a veri-
fication function that use pairs of public and private keys [37]. A message is signed using the
signing function and a private key, and this signature is verified with the verification function and
the corresponding public key. We assume that each correct server has a private key known only by
itself, and that its public key is known by all client processes and servers. We represent a message
signed by a server s with a subscript σs, e.g., mσs .
2.3 Byzantine Quorum Systems
Quorum systems are a technique for implementing dependable shared memory objects in message
passing distributed systems [23]. Given a universe of data servers, a quorum system is a set
of server sets, called quorums, that have a non-empty intersection. The intuition is that if, for
instance, a shared variable is stored replicated in all servers, any read or write operation has to
be done only in a quorum of servers, not in all servers. The existence of intersections between
the quorums allows the development of read and write protocols that maintain the integrity of the
shared variable even if these operations are performed in different quorums.
Byzantine quorum systems are an extension of this technique for environments in which client
processes and servers can fail in a Byzantine way [29]. Formally, a Byzantine quorum system
is a set of server quorums Q ⊆ 2U in which each pair of quorums intersect in sufficiently many
servers (consistency) and there is always a quorum in which all servers are correct (availability).
The servers can be used to implement one or more shared memory objects. In this paper the
servers implement a single object – a tuple space. The servers form a f -masking quorum system,
which tolerates at most f faulty servers, i.e., it masks the failure of at most that number of servers
[29]. This type of Byzantine quorum systems requires that the majority of the servers in the
intersection between any two quorums are correct, thus ∀Q1,Q2 ∈Q, |Q1∩Q2| ≥ 2 f +1. Given
this requirement, each quorum of the system must have q = dn+2 f+12 e servers and the quorum
3In practice this stable period has to be long enough for the algorithm to terminate, but does not need to be forever.
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system can be defined as: Q = {Q ⊆U : |Q| = q}. This implies that |U | = n ≥ 4 f + 1 servers
[29]. With these constraints, a quorum system with n= 4 f +1 will have quorums of size 3 f +1.
2.4 Byzantine PAXOS
Since LBTS requires some modifications to the basic Byzantine PAXOS total order protocol [11],
this section briefly presents this protocol.
The protocol begins with a client sending a signed message m to all servers (see Figure 1).
One of the servers, called the leader, is responsible for ordering the messages sent by the clients.
The leader then sends a PRE-PREPARE message to all servers giving a sequence number i to m.
A server accepts a PRE-PREPARE message if the proposal of the leader is good: the signature
of m verifies and no other PRE-PREPARE message was accepted for sequence number i. When
a server accepts a PRE-PREPARE message, it sends a PREPARE message with m and i to all
servers. When a server receives dn+ f2 e PREPARE messages with the same m and i, it marks m
as prepared and sends a COMMIT message with m and i to all servers. When a server receives
dn+ f2 e COMMIT messages with the same m and i, it commits m, i.e., accepts that message m is
the i-th message to be delivered.
s
s
s
1
2
3
4
c
s
PRE−PREPARE COMMITPREPARE
Byzantine Paxos
TO−Multicast(m)
TO−delivery(m)
Figure 1: Byzantine PAXOS total order multicast execution.
While the PREPARE phase of the protocol ensures that there cannot be two prepared messages
for the same sequence number i (which is sufficient to order messages when the leader is correct),
the COMMIT phase ensures that a message committed with sequence number i will have this
sequence number even if the leader is faulty.
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When the leader is detected to be faulty, a leader election protocol is used to freeze the current
round of the protocol, elect a new leader and start a new round. When a new leader is elected,
it collects the protocol state from dn+ f2 e servers. The protocol state comprises information about
accepted, prepared and committed messages. This information is signed and allows the new
leader to verify if some message was already committed with some sequence number. Then, the
new leader continues to order messages.
3 Tuple Space Correctness Conditions
Informally, a tuple space has to provide the semantics presented in Section 2.1. Here we specify
this semantics formally using the notion of history [26].
A history H models an execution of a concurrent system composed by a set of processes and
a shared memory object (a tuple space in our case). A history is a finite sequence of operation
invocation events and operation response events. A subhistory S of a history H is a subsequence
of the events of H.
We specify the properties of a tuple space in terms of sequential histories, i.e., histories in
which the first event is an invocation and each invocation is directly followed by the correspond-
ing response (or an event that signals the operation completion). We represent a sequential history
H by a sequence of pairs 〈operation,response〉 separated by commas. We also separate subhis-
tories by commas to form a new (sub)history. We use the membership operation ∈ to mean “is a
subhistory of”.
A set of histories is said to be prefix-closed if H being in the set implies every prefix of H is
also in the set. A sequential specification for an object is a prefix-closed set of sequential histories
of that object.
A sequential specification for a tuple space is a set of prefix-closed histories of a tuple space
in which any history H and any subhistory S of H satisfy the following properties4:
1. S,〈rdp(t), t〉 ∈ H ⇒ ∃〈out(t),ack〉 ∈ S
2. S,〈rdp(t), t〉 ∈ H ⇒ @〈inp(t ′), t〉 ∈ S
4These properties also specify the blocking operations, substituting inp/rdp respectively by in/rd.
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3. S,〈inp(t), t〉 ∈ H ⇒ ∃〈out(t),ack〉 ∈ S
4. 〈inp(t), t〉,S ∈ H ⇒ @〈inp(t ′), t〉 ∈ S
The first property states that if a tuple t is read at a given instant, it must have been written
before (the response for out(t) is an acknowledgment, ack). The other properties have the same
structure. For simplicity, the properties assume that each tuple is unique, i.e., that it is inserted
only once in the space.
The properties 1-4 presented above are sufficient to prove tuple space linearizability, however,
other property, that we call not match is needed to define when non-blocking read operations (rdp
or inp) can return ⊥. This property states the following: (No match) the special value ⊥ can only
be returned as a result of rdp(t) (or inp(t)) if there is no tuple that matchs t inserted before the
operation or all these tuples were removed before the operation.
We give a sequential specification of a tuple space but we want these properties to be satisfied
by LBTS even when it is accessed concurrently by a set of processes. We guarantee this is
indeed the case by proving that LBTS is linearizable [26] (see Appendix). This property states,
informally, that operations invoked concurrently appear to take effect instantaneously sometime
between their invocation and the return of a response (those not invoked concurrently are executed
in the order they are invoked). In other words, any concurrent history of LBTS is equivalent to a
sequential history. One should note that the sequential specification given above considers each
tuple individually. This is sufficient to ensure the linearizability of LBTS given the inherent non-
determinism on tuple access of the tuple space coordination model [21] (e.g., two sucessive rdp
using the same template do not need to result on the same tuple reading).
The five properties above are safety properties of a tuple space. The liveness property we are
interested in providing is wait-free termination [25]: every correct client process that invokes a
non-blocking tuple space operation eventually receives a response, independent from other client
failures or tuple space contention.
4 Linearizable Byzantine Tuple Space
This section presents LBTS. We concentrate our discussion only in tuple space non-blocking
operations.
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4.1 Design Rationale and New Techniques
The design philosophy of LBTS is to use quorum-based protocols for read (rdp) and write (out)
operations, and an agreement primitive for the read-remove operation (inp). The implementation
of this philosophy requires the development of some new techniques, described in this section.
To better understand these techniques let us recall how basic quorum-based protocols work.
Traditionally, the objects implemented by quorums are read-write registers [4, 10, 28, 29, 30, 33].
The state of a register in each replica is represented by its current value and a timestamp (a kind
of “version number”). The write protocol usually consists in (i.) reading the register current
timestamp from a quorum, (ii.) incrementing it, and (iii.) writing the new value with the new
timestamp in a quorum (deleting the old value). In the read protocol, the standard procedure is
(i.) reading the pair timestamp-value from a quorum and (ii.) applying some read consolidation
rule such as “the current value of the register is the one associated with the greater timestamp that
appears f +1 times” to define what is the current value stored in the register. To ensure register
linearizability (a.k.a. atomicity) two techniques are usually employed: write-backs – the read
value is written again in the system to ensure that it will be the result of subsequent reads (e.g.,
[28, 30]) – or the listener communication pattern – the reader registers itself with the quorum
system servers for receiving updates on the register values until it receives the same register state
(timestamp-value) from a quorum, ensuring that this state will be observed in subsequent reads
(e.g., [4, 10, 33]).
In trying to develop a tuple space object using these techniques two differences between this
object and a register were observed: (1.) the state of the tuple space (the tuples it contains) can
be arbitrarily large and (2.) the inp operation cannot be implemented by read and write protocols
due to the requirement that the same tuple cannot be removed by two concurrent operations.
Difference (1.) turns difficult using timestamps for defining what is the current state of the space
(the state can be arbitrarily large) while difference (2.) requires that concurrent inp operations
are executed in total order by all servers. The challenge is how to develop quorum protocols
for implementing an object that does not use timestamps for versioning and, at the same time,
requires a total order protocol in one operation. To solve these problems, we developed three
algorithmic techniques.
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The first technique introduced in LBTS serves to avoid timestamps in a collection object
(one that its state is composed by a set of items added to it): we partition the state of the tuple
space in infinitely many simpler objects, the tuples, that have three states: not inserted, inserted,
and removed. This means that when a process invokes a read operation, the space chooses the
response from the set of matching tuples that are in the inserted state. So, it does not need the
version (timestamp) of the tuple space, because the read consolidation rule is applied to tuples
and not to the space state.
The second technique is the application of the listener communication pattern in the rdp op-
eration, to ensure that the usual quorum reasoning (e.g., a tuple can be read if it appears in f +1
servers) can be applied in the system even in parallel with executions of Byzantine PAXOS for inp
operations. In the case of a tuple space, the inp operation is the single read-write operation: ‘if
there is some tuple that match t on the space, remove it’. The listener pattern is used to “fit” the
rdp between the occurrence of two inp operations. As will be seen in Section 4.2.2, the listener
pattern is not used to ensure linearizability (as in previous works [4, 10, 33]), but for capturing
replicas’ state between removals. Linearizability is ensured using write-backs.
The third technique is the modification of the Byzantine PAXOS algorithm to allow the leader
to propose the order plus a candidate result for an operation, allowing the system to reach an
agreement even when there is no state agreement between the replicas. This is the case when
the tuple space has to select a tuple to be removed that is not present in all servers. Notice that,
without this modification, two agreements would have to be executed: one to decide what inp
would be the first to remove a tuple, in case of concurrency (i.e., to order inp requests), and
another to decide which tuple would be the result of the inp.
Another distinguished feature of LBTS is the number of replicas it requires. The minimal
number of replicas required for asynchronous Byzantine-resilient quorum and consensus proto-
cols are 3 f + 1 [7, 33]5. However, LBTS requires n ≥ 4 f + 1 replicas. 3 f + 1 replicas imply
a quorum system with self-verifiable data, which requires a cryptographic expensive two-step
preparing phase for write protocols [28], or the use of timestamps for the tuple space, which re-
quires two additional steps in the out protocol that are vulnerable to timestamp exhaustion attacks.
5Without using special components like in [13], or weakening the protocol semantics, like in [34], when only
n≥ 2 f +1 suffices.
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Solving this kind of attack requires asymmetric cryptography [28], threshold cryptography [10]
or 4 f +1 replicas [4]. Moreover, the use of f more replicas allows the use of authenticators [11]
in some operations that require digital signatures (see Section 5). Concluding, we trade f more
replicas for simplicity and enhanced performance.
4.2 Protocols
Additional assumptions. We adopt several simplifications to improve the presentation of the
protocols. First, we assume that all tuples are unique. In practice this might be implemented by
appending to each tuple its writer id and a sequence number generated by the writer. Second, we
assume that any message that was supposed to be signed by a server s and is not correctly signed is
simply ignored. Third, all messages carry nonces in order to avoid replay attacks. Fourth, access
control is implicitly enforced: the tuple space has some kind of access control mechanism (like
an ACL) specifying what processes can insert tuples in it and each tuple has two sets of processes
that can read and remove it. Fifth, the algorithms are described considering a single tuple space
T , but their extension to support multiple tuple spaces is straightforward: a copy of each space is
deployed in each server and all protocols are executed in the scope of one of the spaces (adding a
field in each message indicating which tuple space is being accessed). Finally, we assume that the
reactions of the servers to message receptions are atomic, i.e., that they are not preempted (e.g.,
lines 3-6 in Algorithm 1).
Protocol variables. Before we delve into the protocols, we have to introduce four variables stored
in each server s: Ts, rs, Rs and Ls. Ts is the local copy of the tuple space T in this server. The
variable rs gives the number of tuples previously removed from the tuple space replica in s. The
set Rs contains the tuples already removed from the local copy of the tuple space (Ts). We call
Rs the removal set and we use it to ensure that a tuple is not removed more than once from Ts.
Variable rs is updated only by the inp protocol. Later, in Section 4.2.3, we see that this operation
is executed in all servers in the same order. Therefore, the value of rs follows the same sequence
in all correct servers. In the basic protocol (without the improvements of Section 5) rs = |Rs|.
Finally, the set Ls contains all clients registered to receive updates from this tuple space. This set
is used in the rdp operation (Section 4.2.2). The protocols use a function send(to,msg) to send
a message msg to the recipient to, and a function receive(from,msg) to receive a message, where
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from is the sender and msg the message received.
4.2.1 Tuple Insertion - out
Algorithm 1 presents the out protocol. This protocol allows multiple writers without timestamps.
Algorithm 1 out operation (client p and server s).
{CLIENT}
procedure out(t)
1: ∀s ∈U , send(s,〈OUT, t〉)
2: wait until ∃Q ∈Q : ∀s ∈ Q, receive(s,〈ACK-OUT〉)
{SERVER}
upon receive(p,〈OUT, t〉)
3: if t /∈ Rs then
4: Ts← Ts∪{t}
5: end if
6: send(p,〈ACK-OUT〉)
When a process p wants to insert a tuple t in the tuple space, it sends t to all servers (line 1)
and waits for acknowledgments from a quorum of servers6 (line 2). At the server side, if the tuple
is not in the removal set Rs (indicating that it has already been removed) (line 3), it is inserted in
the tuple space (line 4). An acknowledgment is returned (line 6).
With this simple algorithm a faulty client process can inserts a tuple in a subset of the servers.
In that case, we say that it is an incompletely inserted tuple. The number of incomplete insertions
made by a process can be bounded to one, as described in Section 5. As can be seen in next
sections, rdp (resp. inp) operations are able to read (resp. remove) such a tuple if it is inserted in
f +1 servers.
Notice that this protocol is always fast (terminates in two communication steps) [15]. Addi-
tionally, this protocol is confirmable [34], i.e., a process executing out knows when the operation
ends. Therefore, it provides an ordered semantics for out, which makes the coordination language
provided by LBTS Turing powerful [8], i.e., all computable functions can be implemented using
it.
4.2.2 Tuple Reading - rdp
rdp is implemented by the protocol presented in Algorithm 2. The protocol is more tricky than
the previous one for two reasons. First, it employs the listener communication pattern to capture
the replicas state between removals. Second, if a matching tuple is found, the process may have
6In fact, it would be possible to implement this step sending the message to a quorum and then, periodically, to
other servers, until there are responses from a quorum.
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to write it back to the system to ensure that it will be read in subsequent reads, satisfying the
linearizability property.
Algorithm 2 rdp operation (client p and server s).
{CLIENT}
procedure rdp(t)
1: ∀s ∈U , send(s,〈RDP, t〉)
2: ∀x ∈ {1,2, ...},∀s ∈U,Replies[x][s]←⊥
3: repeat
4: wait until receive(s,〈REP-RDP,s,T ts ,rs〉σs)
5: Replies[rs][s]← 〈REP-RDP,s,T ts ,rs〉σs
6: until ∃r ∈ {1,2, ...},{s ∈U : Replies[r][s] 6=⊥} ∈Q
7: {From now on r indicates the r of the condition above}
8: ∀s ∈U , send(s,〈RDP-COMPLETE, t〉)
9: if ∃t,count tuple(t,r,Replies[r])≥ q then
10: return t
11: else if ∃t,count tuple(t,r,Replies[r])≥ f +1 then
12: ∀s ∈U , send(s,〈WRITEBACK, t,Replies[r]〉)
13: wait until ∃Q ∈Q : ∀s ∈ Q, receive(s,〈ACK-WB〉)
14: return t
15: else
16: return ⊥
17: end if
{SERVER}
upon receive(p,〈RDP, t〉)
18: Ls← Ls∪{〈p, t〉}
19: T ts ←{t ∈ Ts : m(t, t)}
20: send(p,〈REP-RDP,s,T ts ,rs〉σs)
upon receive(p,〈RDP-COMPLETE, t〉)
21: Ls← Ls \{〈p, t〉}
upon receive(p,〈WRITEBACK, t,proof 〉)
22: if count tuple(t,proof )≥ f +1 then
23: if t /∈ Rs then
24: Ts← Ts∪{t}
25: end if
26: send(p,〈ACK-WB〉)
27: end if
upon removal of t from Ts or insertion of t in Ts
28: for all 〈p, t〉 ∈ Ls : m(t, t) do
29: T ts ←{t ′ ∈ Ts : m(t ′, t)}
30: send(p,〈REP-RDP,s,T ts ,rs〉σs)
31: end for
Predicate: count tuple(t,r,msgs), |{s ∈U : msgs[s] = 〈REP-RDP,s,T ts ,r〉σs ∧ t ∈ T ts }|
When rdp(t) is called, the client process p sends the template t to the servers (line 1). When
a server s receives this message, it registers p as a listener, and replies with all tuples in Ts that
match t 7 and the current number of tuples already removed rs (lines 18-20). While p is registered
as a listener, whenever a tuple is added or removed from the space a set with the tuples that match
t is sent to p 8 (lines 28-31).
Process p collects replies from the servers, putting them in the Repliesmatrix, until it manages
to have a set of replies from a quorum of servers reporting the state after the same number of tuple
removals r (lines 2-6)9. After that, a RDP-COMPLETE message is sent to the servers (line 8).
The result of the operation depends on a single row r of the matrix Replies. This row represents
a cut on the system state in which a quorum of servers processed exactly the same r removals,
so, in this cut, quorum reasoning can be applied. This mechanism is fundamental to ensure that
agreement algorithms and quorum-based protocols can be used together for different operations,
7If there are many tuples, only a given number of the oldest tuples are sent, and the client can request more as
needed.
8In practice, only the update is sent to p.
9We use a matrix in the algorithm just to simplify the exposition. In practice this matrix is very sparse so it would
have to be implemented using some other structure, like a list.
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one of the novel ideas of this paper. If there is some tuple t in Replies[r] that was replied by all
servers in a quorum, then t is the result of the operation (lines 9-10). This is possible because this
quorum ensures that the tuple can be read in all subsequent reads, thus ensuring linearizability.
On the contrary, if there is no tuple replied by an entire quorum, but there is still some tuple t
returned by more than f servers10 for the same value of r, then t is write-back in the servers (line
11-12). The purpose of this write-back operation is to ensure that if t has not been removed until
r, then it will be readable by all subsequent rdp(t) operations requested by any client, with m(t, t)
and until t is removed. Therefore, the write-back is necessary to handle incompletely inserted
tuples.
Upon the reception of a write-back message 〈WRITEBACK, t,proof 〉, server s verifies if the
write-back is justified, i.e., if proof includes at least f + 1 correctly signed REP-RDP messages
from different servers with r and t (line 22). A write-back that is not justified is ignored by correct
servers. After this verification, if t is not already in Ts and has not been removed, then s inserts
t in its local tuple space (lines 23-24). Finally, s sends a ACK-WB to the client (line 26), which
waits for these replies from a quorum of servers and returns t (lines 13-14).
4.2.3 Tuple Destructive Reading - inp
The previous protocols are implemented using only Byzantine quorum techniques. The protocol
for inp, on the other hand, requires stronger abstractions. This is a direct consequence of the
tuple space semantics that does not allow inp to remove the same tuple twice (once removed it is
no longer available). This is what makes the tuple space shared memory object have consensus
number two [39, 25].
An approach to implement this semantics is to execute all inp operations in the same order in
all correct servers. This can be made using a total order multicast protocol based on the Byzantine
PAXOS algorithm (see Section 2.4). A simple approach would be to use it as an unmodified
building block, but this requires two executions of the protocol for each inp [6]. To avoid this
overhead, the solution we propose is based on modifying this algorithm in three specific points:
1. When the leader s receives a request inp(t) from client p (i.e., a message 〈INP, p, t〉), it
10If a tuple is returned by less than f + 1 servers it can be a tuple that has not been inserted in the tuple space,
created by a collusion of faulty servers.
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sends to the other servers a PRE-PREPARE message with not only the sequence number i
but also 〈tt ,〈INP, p, t〉σp〉σs , where tt is a tuple in Ts that matches t. If there is no tuple that
matches t in Ts, then tt =⊥.
2. A correct server s′ accepts to remove the tuple tt proposed by the leader in the
PRE-PREPARE message if: (i.) the usual Byzantine PAXOS conditions for acceptance
described in Section 2.4 are satisfied; (ii.) s′ did not accept the removal of tt previously;
(iii.) tt and t match; and (iv.) tt is not forged, i.e., either t ∈ Ts or s′ received f + 1 signed
messages from different servers ensuring that they have t in their local tuple spaces. This
last condition ensures that a tuple t can be removed if and only if it can be read, i.e., only if
at least f +1 servers report having it.
3. When a new leader l′ is elected, each server sends its protocol state to l′ (as in the original
total order Byzantine PAXOS algorithm11) and a signed set with the tuples in its local tuple
space that match t. This information is used by l′ to build a proof for a proposal with a tuple
t (in case it gets that tuple from f +1 servers). If there is no tuple reported by f +1 servers,
this set of tuples justifies a ⊥ proposal. This condition can be seen as a write-back from the
leader in order to ensure that the tuple will be available in sufficiently many replicas before
its removal.
Giving these modifications on the total order protocol, an inp operation is executed by Algo-
rithm 3.
For a client p, the inp(t) algorithm works exactly as if the replicated tuple space was imple-
mented using state machine replication based on Byzantine PAXOS [11]: p sends a request to
all servers and waits until f + 1 servers reply with the same response, which is the result of the
operation (lines 1-3).
In the server side, the requests for executions of inp received are inserted in the pending set
Ps. When this set is not empty, the code in lines 4-13 is executed by the leader (the predicate
paxos leader(s) is true iff s is the current leader). For each pending request in Ps, a sequence
number is attributed (line 5). Then, the leader picks a tuple from the tuple space that matches
11The objective is to ensure that a value decided by some correct server in some round (i.e., the request sequence
number and the reply) will be the only possible decision in all subsequent rounds.
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Algorithm 3 inp operation (client p and server s).
{CLIENT}
procedure inp(t)
1: TO-multicast(U,〈INP, p, t〉)
2: wait until receive 〈REP-INP, tt〉 from f +1 servers inU
3: return tt
{SERVER}
upon paxos leader(s)∧Ps 6= /0
4: for all 〈INP, p, t〉 ∈ Ps do
5: i← i+1
6: if ∃t ∈ Ts : m(t, t)∧¬marked(t) then
7: tt ← t
8: mark(i, t)
9: else
10: tt ←⊥
11: end if
12: paxos propose(i,〈tt ,〈INP, p, t〉〉)
13: end for
upon paxos deliver(i,〈tt ,〈INP, p, t〉〉)
14: unmark(i)
15: Ps← Ps \{〈INP, p, t〉}
16: if tt 6=⊥ then
17: if tt ∈ Ts then
18: Ts← Ts \{tt}
19: end if
20: Rs← Rs∪{tt}
21: rs← rs+1
22: end if
23: send(p,〈REP-INP, tt〉)
t (lines 6-7) and marks it with its sequence number to prevent it from being removed (line 8).
The procedure mark(i, t) marks the tuple as the one proposed to be removed in the i-th removal,
while the predicate marked(t) says if t is marked for removal. If no unmarked tuple matches t,
⊥ is proposed for the Byzantine PAXOS agreement (using the aforementioned PRE-PREPARE
message), i.e., is sent to the other servers (lines 10, 12). The code in lines 4-13 corresponds to the
modification 1 above. Modifications 2 and 3 do not appear in the code since they are reasonably
simple changes on Byzantine PAXOS algorithm.
When the servers reach agreement about the sequence number and the tuple to remove, the
paxos deliver predicate is set to true and the lines 14-23 of the algorithm are executed. Then,
each server s unmarks any tuple that it marked for removal with the sequence number i (line 14)
and removes the ordered request from Ps (line 15). After that, if the result of the operation is a
valid tuple tt , the server verifies if it exists in the local tuple space Ts (line 17). If it does, it is
removed from Ts (line 18). Finally, tt is added to Rs, the removal counter rs is incremented and
the result is sent to the requesting client process (lines 20-23).
It is worth noticing that Byzantine PAXOS usually does not employ public-key cryptography
when the leader does not change. The signatures required by the protocol are made using au-
thenticators, which are vectors of message authentication codes [11]. However, modification 3
requires that the signed set of tuples will be sent to a new leader when it is elected. Therefore, our
inp protocol requires public-key cryptography, but only when the operation cannot be resolved in
the first Byzantine PAXOS round execution.
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4.3 Correctness
In this section we informaly argue about the correctness of the protocols. The complete proof of
the arguments sketched here are presented in Appendix.
LBTS is linearizable because the tuple space correctness conditions (Section 3) imply that we
only have to deal with concurrent operations that manipulate the same tuple. The algorithms were
build in such a way that, if some process reads a tuple, the write-back phase of the rdp protocol
ensures that this tuple will be available to all other rdp or inp operations until the tuple is removed.
The wait-freedom property is satisfied for all operations simply because the Byzantine PAXOS
protocol always terminate in our (partially synchronous) system model. Therefore, both rdp (in
which a client can have to wait until some removal terminate before collecting responses from
a quorum of servers that executed the same removals) and inp (which comprises, basically, an
execution of this protocol), will terminate.
5 Improvements and Optimizations
Optimizing rdp. The protocol in Algorithm 2 usually does not require the write-back phase
when there are no faulty servers and there are many tuples in the space that match the requested
template. In that case it is very likely that some tuple will be replied by a complete quorum of
servers, thus avoiding the need for verifying if write-backs are justified, something that would
imply verifying the signatures of a set of REP-RDP messages. Public-key cryptography has been
shown to be a major bottleneck in practical Byzantine fault-tolerant systems [11], specially in
LANs and other high speed networks, where the communication latency is lower and public-key
cryptography processing costs dominate the operation latency. To avoid using public-key signa-
tures we propose the following optimization on the rdp protocol: the client first accesses a quorum
of servers asking for the tuples that match the template (without requiring signed REP-RDP mes-
sages from servers or the use of the listener pattern). If there is some tuple t returned by the whole
quorum of servers, then the operation is finished and t is the result. If no tuple is returned by
more than f servers then the operation is finished and the result is ⊥. If some tuple is returned
by at least f +1 servers, it means that possibly a write-back will be needed, so the protocol from
Algorithm 2 is used. Notice that this optimization does not affect the correctness of the protocol
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since the single delicate operation, the write-back, is executed using the normal protocol.
Bounding Memory. As described in Section 4.2, the Rs set stores all tuples removed from the
space at a particular tuple space server s. In long executions, where a large number of tuples is
inserted and removed from the tuple space, the Rs set will use an arbitrary amount of memory.
Even considering that, in practice, we can bound the memory size by discarding old tuples from
this set, since insertions and removals cannot take an infinite amount of time to complete12, in
theoretical terms, this requires unbounded memory in servers. Here, we present a scheme to
discard tuples from the Rs sets.
This scheme is based on two modifications on the protocols. The first need for the unbounded
memory is to avoid that clients executing rdp write-back a tuple which is being removed concur-
rently in the servers that already removed it (line 23 of Algorithm 2). In this way, the requirement
is to prevent that tuples being removed are write-back. This can be implemented making each
server s store the removed tuple t as long as there are rdp operations that started before the re-
moval of t on s. More specifically, a removed tuple t must be stored in Rs until there are no clients
in Ls (listeners set) that began their rdp operations in s (lines 1-17 of Algorithm 2) before the
removal of t from s (lines 14-23 of Algorithm 3). In this way, the Rs set can be “cleaned” when s
receives a message RDP-COMPLETE (line 21 of Algorithm 2).
The second need for unbounded memory on LBTS is avoiding more than one removal of
the same tuple. This problem can happen if some tuple t is removed while its insertion is not
complete, i.e., t is not in the local tuple space of a quorum of servers and is removed from the
tuple space (recall that a tuple can be removed if it appears in at least f + 1 servers). To solve
this problem, we have to implement a control that ensures that a tuple that was not present in the
local tuple space of server s (Ts) when it was removed from the replicated tuple space cannot be
inserted in Ts after its removal (otherwise it could be removed more than once). More specifically,
a removed tuple t will be removed from Rs only if t was received (inserted) by s.
To summarize, a tuple can only be removed from the Rs set when (1.) there is no rdp concur-
rent with the removal and (2.) when the tuple was already received by s.
These two modifications make the amount of tuples stored in the Rs set at a given time directly
12Recall that the removed tuples are stored in this set only to prevent them from being removed more than once
during their insertion and/or removal.
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dependent of the amount of out operations being executed concurrently with removals in s at this
time (in the worst case, the concurrency of the system) and the number of partially inserted tuples
in LBTS (that can be bounded at one per faulty client, as shown bellow).
Bounding Byzantine Clients. The LBTS protocols as described allow a malicious client to
partially insert an unbounded number of tuples in a space. Here we present some modifications
to the out protocol to bound to one the number of incomplete writes that a faulty client can
make. The modifications are based on the use of insertion certificates: sets of signed ACK-OUT
messages from a quorum of servers corresponding to the replies from an OUT message [28].
Each insertion has a timestamp provided by the client. Each server stores the greatest timestamp
used by a client. To insert a new tuple a client must send an OUT message with timestamp greater
than the last used by itself together with the insertion certificate of the previous completed write.
A server accepts an insertion if the presented insertion certificate is valid, i.e., it contains at least
2 f +1 correctly signed ACK-OUT messages.
There are three main implications of this modification. First, it requires that all ACK-OUT
messages are signed by the servers. However, we can avoid public key signature since we are
assuming n ≥ 4 f + 1 servers, and with this number of servers we can use authenticators [11],
a.k.a. MAC vectors that implement signatures using only symmetric cryptography. In this way,
an insertion certificate is valid for a server s if and only if it contains q− f messages correctly
authenticated for this server (the MAC field corresponding to s contains a correct signature).
The second implication is the use of FIFO channels between clients and servers, which were
not needed in the standard protocol. The final implication, also related with FIFO channels, is
that each server must store the timestamp for the last write of a client to evaluate if the insertion
certificate is correct, consequently, the amount of memory needed by the algorithm is proportional
to the number of clients of the system13.
Notice that this modification can be implemented in a layer bellow the LBTS out algorithm,
without requiring any modification in it. Notice also that the use of authenticators adds very
modest latency to the protocol [11].
13In practice this is not a problem, since only a single integer is require to be stored for each client.
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6 Minimal LBTS
As stated in Section 4.1, LBTS requires a sub-optimal number of replicas (n ≥ 4 f + 1) to im-
plement a tuple space with confirmable semantics. However, it is possible to implement a tuple
space with optimal resilience if we sacrifice the confirmation phase of some LBTS protocols. To
implement LBTS with only n ≥ 3 f +1 we need to use an asymmetric Byzantine quorum system
[34]. This type of quorum system has two types of quorums with different sizes: read quorums
with qr = dn+ f+12 e servers and write quorums with qw = dn+2 f+12 e.
The key property of this type of system is that every read quorum intersects every write quo-
rum in at least 2 f +1 servers. This property makes this system very similar to the f -dissemination
quorum system used by LBTS. Thus, the adaptation of LBTS to this kind of quorum is very sim-
ple: we need to make all write quorum operations (out protocol and write-back phase of the rdp
protocol) non-confirmable, i.e., the request for write is sent to a write quorum and there is no wait
for confirmation (ACK-OUT or ACK-WB messages).
In a non-confirmable protocol, the writer does not know when its write completes. In LBTS,
an out(t) operation ends when t is inserted in the local tuple space of qw− f correct servers. The
same happens with the write-back phase of the rdp protocol. Missing this confirmation for an
out operation has subtle but significant impacts on the tuple space computational power: if the
protocol that implements out is non-confirmable, the resulting operation has unordered semantics
and the coordination language provided by the tuple space will not be Turing powerfull [8].
The correctness proof of Minimal LBTS is the same of “normal” LBTS because the intersec-
tion between write and read quorums is at least 2 f +1 servers, which is the same intersection for
the symmetrical quoruns used in LBTS.
7 Evaluation
This section presents an evaluation of the system using two distributed algorithms metrics: mes-
sage complexity and number of communication steps. Message complexity measures the maxi-
mum amount of messages exchanged between processes, so it gives some insight about the com-
munication system usage and the algorithm scalability. The number of communication steps is
the number of sequential communications between processes, so usually it is the main factor for
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the time needed for a distributed algorithm execution to terminate.
In this evaluation, we compare LBTS with an implementation of a tuple space with the same
semantics based on state machine replication [38], which we call SMR-TS. SMR is a generic
solution for the implementation of fault-tolerant distributed services using replication. The idea
is to make all replicas start in the same state and deterministically execute the same operations in
the same order in all replicas. The implementation considered for SMR-TS is based on the total
order algorithm of [11] with the optimization for fast decision (two communication steps) in nice
executions of [44, 32]. This optimization is also considered for the modified Byzantine PAXOS
used in our inp protocol. The SMR-TS implements an optimistic version for read operations in
which all servers return immediately the value read without executing the Byzantine PAXOS; the
operation is successful in this optimistic phase if the process manages to collect n− f identical
replies (and perceives no concurrency), otherwise, the Byzantine PAXOS protocol is executed
and the read result is the response returned by at least f + 1 replicas. This condition ensures
linearizability for all executions.
Operation LBTS SMR-TS
Message Complexity Comm. Steps Message Complexity Comm. Steps
out O(n) 2 O(n2) 4
rdp O(n) 2/4 O(n)/O(n2) 2/6
inp O(n2) 4/7 O(n2) 4
Table 1: Costs in nice executions
Table 1 evaluates nice executions of the operations in terms of message complexity and com-
munication steps14. The costs of LBTS’ operations are presented in the second and third columns
of the table. The fourth and fifth columns show the evaluation of SMR-TS. The LBTS protocol
for out is cheaper than SMR-TS in both metrics. The protocol for rdp has the same costs in LBTS
and SMR-TS in executions in which there is no matching tuple being written concurrently with
rdp. The first values in the line of the table corresponding to rdp are about this optimistic case
(O(n) for message complexity, 2 for communication steps). When a read cannot be made opti-
mistically, the operation requires 4 steps in LBTS and 6 in SMR-TS (optimistic phase plus the
normal operation). Moreover LBTS’ message complexity is linear, instead of O(n2) like SMR-
TS. The protocol for inp uses a single Byzantine PAXOS execution in both approaches. However,
14Recall from Section 2.2 that an execution is said to be nice if the maximum delay ∆ always hold and there are
no failures.
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in cases in which there are many tuples incompletely inserted (extreme contention or too many
faulty clients), LBTS might not decide in the first round (as discussed in Section 5). In this case
a new leader must be elected. We expect this situation to be rare. Notice that LBTS’ quorum-
based protocols (rdp and inp) are fast (terminates in two communication steps) when executed in
favorable settings, matching the lower bound of [15].
The table allow us to conclude that an important advantage of LBTS when compared with
SMR-TS is the fact that in SMR-TS all operations require protocols with message complexity
O(n2), turning simple operations such as rdp and out as complex as inp. Another advantage of
LBTS is that its quorum-based operations, out and rdp, always terminate in few communication
steps while in SMR-TS these operation relies on Byzantine PAXOS, that we can have certainty
that terminates in 4 steps only in nice executions [44, 32].
The evaluation of what happens in “not nice” situations is not shown in the table. In that case,
all operations based on Byzantine PAXOS are delayed until there is enough synchrony for the
protocol to terminate (u>GST ). This problem is especially relevant in systems deployed in large
scale networks and Byzantine environments in which an attacker might delay the communication
at specific moments of the execution of the Byzantine PAXOS algorithm with the purpose of
delaying its termination.
8 Related Work
Two replication approaches can be used to build Byzantine fault-tolerant services: Byzantine
quorum systems [29] and state machine replication [38, 11]. The former is a data centric approach
based on the idea of executing different operations in different intersecting sets of servers, while
the latter is based on maintaining a consistent replicated state across all servers in the system.
One advantage of quorum systems in comparison to the state machine approach is that they do not
need that the operations are executed in the same order in the replicas, so they do not need to solve
consensus. Quorum protocols usually scale much better due to the opportunity of concurrency in
the execution of operations and the shifting of hard work from servers to client processes [1]. On
the other hand, pure quorum protocols cannot be used to implement objects stronger than register
(in asynchronous systems), on the contrary of state machine replication, which is more general
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[17] (but, by the other hand, require aditional assumptions on the system).
The system presented in this paper uses a Byzantine quorum system and provides specific pro-
tocols for tuple space operations. Only one of the protocols (inp) requires a consensus protocol,
therefore it needs more message exchanges and time assumptions (eventual synchrony) to termi-
nate. This requirement is justified by the fact that tuple spaces have consensus number two [39]
according to Herlihy’s wait-free hierarchy [25], therefore they cannot be implemented determin-
istically in a wait-free way in a completely asynchronous system. To the best of our knowledge
there is only one work on Byzantine quorums that has implemented objects more powerful than
registers in a way that is similar to ours, the Q/U protocols [1]. That work aims to implement
general services using quorum-based protocols in asynchronous Byzantine systems. Since this
cannot be done ensuring wait-freedom, the approach sacrifices liveness: the operations are guar-
anteed to terminate only if there is no other operation executing concurrently. A tuple space build
using Q/U has mainly two drawbacks, when compared with LBTS: (i.) it is not wait-free so, in a
Byzantine environment, malicious clients could invoke operations continuously, causing a denial
of service; and (ii.) it requires 5 f +1 servers, f more than LBTS, and it has an impact on the cost
of the system due to the cost of diversity [36].
There are a few other works on Byzantine quorums related to ours. In [4], a non-skipping
timestamps object is proposed. This type of object is equivalent to a fetch&add register, which is
known to have consensus number two [25]. However, in order to implement this object in asyn-
chronous systems using quorums, the specification is weakened in such a way that the resulting
object has consensus number 1 (like a register). Some works propose consensus objects based
on registers implemented using quorum protocols and randomization (e.g., [31]) or failure detec-
tors (e.g., [2]). These works differ fundamentally from ours since they use basic quorum-based
objects (registers) to build consensus while we use consensus to implement a more elaborated
object (tuple space). Furthermore, the coordination algorithms provided in these works requires
that processes know each other, a problem for open systems.
Cowling et al. proposed HQ-REPLICATION [14], an interesting replication scheme that uses
quorum protocols when there are no contention in operations executions and consensus protocols
to resolve contention situations. This protocol requires n ≥ 3 f + 1 replicas and process reads
and writes in 2 to 4 communication steps in contention-free executions. When contention is
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detected, the protocol uses Byzantine PAXOS to order of contending requests. This contention
resolution protocol adds great latency to the protocols, reaching more than 10 communication
steps even in nice executions. Comparing LBTS with a tuple space based on HQ-REPLICATION,
in executions without contention, LBTS’ out will be faster (2 steps instead of 4 of HQ), rdp will
be equivalent (the protocols are similar) and inp will have the same latency in both, however,
LBTS’ protocol has O(n2)message complexity instead of O(n) of HQ. In contending executions,
LBTS is expected to outperform HQ in orders of magnitude since its protocols are little affected
by these situations. On the other hand, HQ-REPLICATION requires f fewer replicas than LBTS.
There are several works that replicate tuple spaces for fault tolerance. Some of them are based
on the state machine approach (e.g., [3]) while others use quorum systems (e.g., [43]). However,
none of these proposals deals with Byzantine failures and intrusions, the main objective of LBTS.
The construction presented in this paper, LBTS, builds on a preliminary solution with several
limitations, BTS [6]. LBTS goes much further in mainly three aspects: it is linearizable; it uses
a confirmable protocol for operation out (improving its semantical power [8]); and it implements
the inp operation using only one Byzantine PAXOS execution, instead of two in BTS.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we presented the design of LBTS, a Linearizable Byzantine Tuple Space. This
construction provides reliability, availability and integrity for coordination between processes in
open distributed systems. The overall system model is based on a set of servers from which
less than a fourth may be faulty and on an unlimited number of client processes, from which
arbitrarily many can also be faulty. Given the time and space decoupling offered by the tuple
space coordination model [9], this model appears to be an interesting alternative for coordination
of non-trusted process in practical dynamic distributed systems (like P2P networks on the Internet
or infrastructured wireless networks).
LBTS uses a novel hybrid replication technique which combines Byzantine quorum systems
protocols with consensus-based protocols resulting in a design in which simple operations use
simple quorum-based protocols while a more complicated operation, which requires servers’s
synchronization, uses more complex agreement-based protocols. The integration of these two
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replication approaches required the development of some novel algorithmic techniques that are
interesting by themselves. Concerning tuple space implementation, an important contribution of
this work is the assertion that out and rdp can be implemented using quorum-based protocols,
while inp requires consensus. This design shows important benefits when compared with the
same object implemented using state machine replication.
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Appendix: LBTS Correctness Proof
In this Appendix we prove that our protocols implement a tuple space that satisfies the correctness
conditions stated in Section 3. We consider the protocols as presented in Section 4. In this section,
when we say that a tuple t exists in some server s, or that server s has t, we mean that t ∈ Ts. Recall
that there are |U |= n≥ 4 f +1 servers and that the quorum size is q= dn+2 f+12 e 15.
We begin by defining the notion of readable tuple.
Definition 1 A tuple t is said to be readable if it would be the result of a rdp(t) operation, with
m(t, t), executed without concurrency in a tuple space containing only the tuple t.
The definition states that a tuple is readable if it would be the result of some rdp operation,
independently of the accessed quorum or the number of failures in the system (but assuming less
than n/4 servers fail). From the algorithm that implements rdp, line 11, it is simple to infer that
a tuple is readable if it exists in f +1 correct servers in any quorum of the system. This implies
that the tuple must exist in n−q+ f +1 correct servers ( f +1 servers from the quorum plus n−q
servers not from the quorum). The concept of readable tuple is used in the proofs to assert that
if a tuple is correctly inserted, then it can be read (it is readable) or that if a tuple is correctly
15The proofs in this section are generic but we suggest the reader to use n= 4 f +1 and q= 3 f +1 to make them
simpler to understand.
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removed, then it cannot be read (it is not readable).
Given this definition, we state a lemma showing that if a tuple is readable then it can be
removed.
Lemma 1 If after an operation op a tuple t is readable, then t will be the result of inp(t) executed
immediately after op.
Proof: Assume that after op the number of removed tuples is r. Assume a correct process p
invokes inp(t). If a tuple t is readable after r removals then there are at least n−q+ f +1 correct
servers that have t. In this condition, we have to prove that an execution of inp(t) must return t.
Considering that the current leader in the execution of the Byzantine PAXOS is the server l, we
have to consider two cases:
1. l is correct – two cases have to be considered:
(a) t ∈ Tl: in this case l will propose t to be the result of the operation (and no other tuple
due to the definition of readable tuple). Since at least n− q+ f + 1 correct servers
have t, they will accept this proposal and the tuple will be the result of the operation.
(b) t /∈ Tl: in this case l will propose ⊥. This value will not be accepted because t exists
in n− q+ f + 1 correct servers, so at most q− f − 1 < dn+ f2 e servers can accept ⊥
16. Therefore, a new leader is elected. Since no tuple was accepted for removal by
n− q+ f + 1 servers, this leader will be able to choose t as the result. Any other
proposal will be rejected and will cause a new leader election. Eventually a leader
with t ∈ Tl will be elected and case 1.(a) will apply.
2. l is faulty – in this case, l can propose ⊥ or some t ′ 6= t. If ⊥ is proposed, it will not be
accepted by any of the n− q+ f + 1 correct servers that have t (because m(t, t)). If t ′ is
proposed, it will not be accepted by more than f servers so it is not decided as the result of
the operation. The reason for this is that, by the definition of readable, there is no other tuple
in the space that matches t, so no correct server will have t ′ in its local tuple space (or t ′ and
t do not match). In both cases there will be at most n−q+ f servers that accept the result
proposed by the leader and the decision will not be reached in this round, consequently a
16Recall that in the Byzantine PAXOS a value can be decided only if d n+ f2 e servers accept it (Section 2.4).
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new leader will be elected. Depending on this leader being correct or not, cases 1 or 2 apply
again.
In both cases, the result of the inp(t) will be t. 
The following lemma proves that a tuple cannot be read before being inserted in the space.
This lemma is important because it shows that faulty servers cannot “create” tuples.
Lemma 2 Before an 〈out(t)/ack〉, t is not readable.
Proof: A tuple will be considered for reading if at least f + 1 servers send it in reply to a read
request. This means that at least one correct server must reply it. Since before out(t) no correct
server will reply the tuple t, then t is not readable. 
Lemma 3 After a 〈out(t)/ack〉 and before a 〈inp(t)/t〉, t is readable.
Proof: The definition of readable considers that t is the only tuple in the tuple space that matches
t. If t has been inserted by an out(t) then there is a quorum of servers Q1 that have t. Consider
a read operation performed after that insertion but before the removal of t from the space. We
have to prove that t must be the result of a rdp(t), assuming that m(t, t). After line 6 of the rdp(t)
protocol, we know that a quorum Q2 of servers replied the matching tuples they have after r
removals. Every correct server of Q2 that is member of Q1 will reply t. Since the intersection of
two quorums has at least 2 f + 1 servers, |Q1∩Q2| ≥ 2 f + 1, from which at most f are faulty, t
will be returned by at least f + 1 servers and will be the result of the operation. Therefore, t is
readable. 
The following lemma proves that when a tuple is read it remains readable until it is removed.
Lemma 4 After a 〈rdp(t)/t〉 and before an 〈inp(t)/t〉, t is readable.
Proof: We know that a quorum of servers has t after a rdp(t) operation that returns t (due to the
write-back phase). Therefore, following the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 3, we can
infer that t is readable. 
The following two lemmas prove that it is not possible to remove a tuple twice.
Lemma 5 After a 〈inp(t)/t〉, t is not readable.
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Proof: Assume t was the r-th tuple removed from the space. Assume also, for sake of simplicity,
that there are no more removals in the system. We will prove this lemma by contradiction. Sup-
pose that a rdp(t) operation executed after r removals returns t. This implies that t was reported
by at least f +1 servers that have removed r tuples. This is clearly impossible because no correct
server will report t after removing it. Consequently, the lemma is proved. 
Lemma 6 A tuple t cannot be removed more than once.
Proof: Due to the Byzantine PAXOS total order algorithm safety properties, all removals are
executed sequentially, one after another. The modification number 2 of this algorithm in Section
4.2.3 prevents correct servers from accepting for removal tuples already removed. 
The following lemmas state that the three operations provided by LBTS satisfy wait-freedom
[25], i.e., that they always terminate in our system model when invoked by a correct client.
Lemma 7 Operation out is wait-free.
Proof: An inspection of Algorithm 1 shows that the only place in which it can block is when
waiting for replies from a quorum of servers (q servers) in line 2. Since all correct servers reply
and q≤ n− f (availability property in Section 2.3), the algorithm does not block. 
Lemma 8 Operation rdp is wait-free.
Proof: In the first phase of Algorithm 2, client p waits for replies from a quorum of servers that
removed r tuples. The Byzantine PAXOS guarantees that if a correct server removed r tuples then
eventually all other correct servers will also remove r tuples. The listener pattern makes each
server notify p with the tuples that combine with its template after each removal, so eventually
there will be some r for which all correct servers replied to the read operation after r removals.
Therefore, the first phase of the algorithm always terminate.
The write-back phase, when necessary, also satisfies wait-freedom since the condition for the
client to unblock is the reception of confirmations from a quorum of servers. Since there is always
a quorum of correct servers (as q≤ n− f ) and these servers always reply to a write-back correctly
justified, the client cannot block. 
Lemma 9 Operation inp is wait-free.
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Proof: The liveness of this operation depends of the modified Byzantine PAXOS. This protocol
guarantees that a new leader will be elected until there is some correct leader in a “synchronous”
round (i.e., a round in which all messages are exchanged within certain time limits and the leader
is not suspected). In this round, the leader will propose a sequence number and a result t for the
inp(t) operation invoked. The properties of Byzantine PAXOS ensure that the sequence number
is valid. The result tuple t will be accepted by the servers if it is accepted by dn+ f2 e servers. This
happens if t the out(t) protocol was correctly executed by the client that inserted t in the space, or
if t is correctly justified by a proposal certificate. Therefore, we have to consider three cases:
1. t was completely inserted. In this case q = dn+2 f+12 e servers have t and at least q− f (the
correct ones) will accept the proposal. Since q− f ≥ dn+ f2 e always holds for n ≥ 4 f + 1,
this proposal will eventually be decided.
2. t was partially inserted. If t exists in dn+ f2 e servers, it will be accepted and decided as
the result of the operation. If t was justified by a proposal certificate showing that t exists
in at least f + 1 servers, it will be accepted and eventually decided. If neither t exists in
dn+ f2 e servers nor it is justified by a proposal certificate, this value will not be accepted
by sufficiently many servers and a new leader will be elected. This leader will receive the
matching tuples of all servers and then, if it is correct, will choose a result that can be
justified for the operation.
3. t = ⊥. This value will be accepted by a server if there is no tuple that matches the given
template or if this value is justified by a proposal certificate (if the certificate shows that
there is no tuple that exists in f + 1 servers). If this value is accepted by dn+ f2 e servers, it
will be eventually decided.
In all these cases, t will be accepted, and the operation ends. 
Using all these lemmas we can prove that LBTS is a tuple space implementation that satisfies
linearizability and wait-freedom.
Theorem 1 LBTS is a linearizable wait-free tuple space.
Proof: Wait-freedom is ensured by Lemmas 7, 8 and 9, so we only have to prove linearizability.
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Consider any history H of a system in which processes interact uniquely through LBTS. We
consider that H is complete, i.e., all invocations in H have a matching response17. In this history
a set of tuples TH are manipulated, i.e., read, inserted or removed. Since there is no interference
between operations that manipulate different tuples, we can consider that each tuple t is a different
object and for each tuple t ∈ TH we denote byH|t the subhistory ofH that contains only operations
that manipulate t.
For eachH|t, our tuple uniqueness assumption ensures that there will be only one 〈out(t)/ack〉
and Lemma 6 ensures that there will be no more than one removal of t in this subhistory. There-
fore, H|t contains one out operation, zero or more readings of t and at most one inp operation
with result t.
The proof that LBTS is a linearizable tuple space has three steps. First, we build a sequential
history H ′|t for each tuple t ∈ TH with all sequential operations of H|t preserving their original
order. The second step is to order concurrent operations according to the properties of LBTS
(stated by Lemmas 1-6). Then we will show that H ′|t is according to a sequential specification of
a tuple space in which just one tuple is manipulated. Finally, we will use the locality property of
linearizability (Theorem 1 of [26]): if for all t ∈ TH , H|t is linearizable, then H is linearizable.
1. For sequential operations, for each tuple t ∈ TH , Lemmas 2 and 3 show that a 〈rdp(t)/t〉
can only occur in H|t after its insertion. Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 show that all 〈rdp(t)/t〉 will
happen before the removal of t.
2. For each tuple t ∈ H, we will order concurrent operations in H|t, obtaining H ′|t with all
operations in H|t. The ordering is done the following way: all 〈rdp(t)/t〉 are put after
〈out(t)/ack〉 (Lemma 2 states that t cannot be read before 〈out(t)/ack〉, and Lemma 3
states t can be read after 〈out(t)/ack〉) and before 〈inp(t)/t〉 (Lemma 3 states that t can be
read before 〈inp(t)/t〉 and Lemma 5 states that t cannot be read after 〈inp(t)/t〉). The order
between different rdp operations that return t does not matter since Lemma 4 states that
once read, t will always be read until its removal.
3. After ordering the operations in the described way, all histories H ′|t, for each tuple t ∈ TH
will begin with an 〈out(t)/ack〉, will have zero or more 〈rdp(t)/t〉 after, and can end with an
17If it is not complete, we can extend it with the missing matching responses.
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〈inp(t)/t〉. Clearly, this history satisfies all four correctness conditions presented in Section
3, even when operations are executed concurrently in the system. Therefore, for all t ∈ TH ,
H|t is linearizable.
4. Using the linearizability locality property, we conclude that H is linearizable.
This means that all histories in which a set of processes communicate uniquely using LBTS are
linearizable, so LBTS is linearizable. 
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